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COMMIL USA, LLC v. CISCO SYSTEMS: JOINING POLICY AND 
PROSE TO FOSTER A GOOD FAITH ANALYSIS 
THERESA E. DURANTE∗ 
In the technical game of induced patent infringement, subjectivity 
plays a significant role.1  Traditionally, defendants accused of patent 
infringement present a layered defense, asserting both that the patent is 
invalid and not infringed.2  Increasingly, however, alleged infringers 
include claims of good faith, yet misguided, beliefs of noninfringement and 
invalidity.3  When effectively argued, these types of affirmative defenses 
negate the intent requirement, carefully crafted by the legislature and 
judiciary, necessary to impose liability for induced patent infringement.4 
In Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems,5 the United States Supreme 
Court restricted the extent to which subjectivity shields induced 
infringement liability.6  The Court held that a belief regarding patent 
invalidity, even one asserted in good faith, is not a defense to a claim of 
induced infringement under Section 271(b) of the Patent Act.7 
The Commil Court correctly rejected this good faith defense in an 
effort to streamline induced patent infringement claims and deter future 
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 1.  See infra Part II.C. 
 2.  Nathan A. Sloan, Think It Is Invalid? A New Defense to Negate Intent for Induced 
Infringement, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 613, 613 (2013) (relying on Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 
412 F.3d 1340, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 3.  See infra Part II.C. 
 4.  Id.   
 5.  135 S. Ct. 1920, 1922 (2015). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id.  Section 271(b) provides that, “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent 
shall be liable as an infringer.”  35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012). 
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inducers who attempt to game the defense.8  Despite reaffirming its holding 
in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,9 the Supreme Court did not 
root its analysis in preserving the level of intent required for induced 
infringement liability.10  Instead, the Court focused on the distinction 
between “validity” and “infringement.”11  Although the issues are 
structurally separate in the Patent Act, scholars argue that dividing validity 
and infringement is counterintuitive, given their seemingly intertwined 
existences.12 
The Court could have strengthened its holding by incorporating the 
policy rationales underpinning the purposes of Section 271(b).13  These 
rationales would provide clarification of the existing intent requirement, 
equitable protection for patentees and the free marketplace, and facilitation 
of the cross-application of intellectual property doctrines.14  With this 
approach, the Commil holding, inclusive of both substantive law and public 
policy, could have furthered courts’ understanding of both induced patent 
infringement and the intellectual property market as a whole.15 
I.  THE CASE 
Commil USA, LLC (“Commil”) is the patent holder for a method of 
implementing short-range wireless networks.16  The patent (“‘395”) 
specifically relates to the use of time synchronization in order to provide 
faster and more reliable communication between base stations and mobile 
devices in a network area.17 
In 2007, Commil brought claims of direct and induced infringement of 
the ‘395 patent against its competitor, Cisco Systems, Inc. (“Cisco”), a 
                                                          
 8.  See infra Part IV. 
 9.  131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).  In Global-Tech, the Supreme Court held that in order to impose 
liability for induced infringement, the inducer must have knowledge that the patent exists and that 
the induced acts would cause infringement.  Id. at 2068. 
 10.  See infra Part III.  
 11.  Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1928.  
 12.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 13.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 14.  See infra Part IV.A−C. 
 15.  See infra Part IV.B−C. 
 16.  Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated, 
135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015).  Wireless local area networks (“WLANs”), also known to the public as 
“WiFi,” provide access points to connect laptops and other mobile devices to the Internet.  WiFi 
connections between base stations and mobile devices require users to remain relatively close to a 
base station, and thus are short-range.  Brief of Petitioner at 4, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (No. 13-896). 
 17.  Commil, 720 F.3d at 1364.  Patent ‘395 is directed to wireless networks too large to be 
covered by a single base station (e.g., universities and large corporate buildings).  The claimed 
technique would enable users of mobile devises to move seamlessly throughout the network 
coverage area.  Brief of Petitioner at 4, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 
(2015) (No. 13-896).  
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major supplier of WiFi access points and controllers.18  On May 17, 2010, a 
jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 
found Cisco liable for direct infringement and awarded Commil $3.7 
million in damages.19  Following a motion filed by Commil, a second trial 
was held with respect to induced infringement allegations.20  In September 
2011, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Commil, resulting in a final 
amended judgment granting the company $63.7 million in actual 
damages.21 
Cisco appealed the district court decision on several grounds.  Cisco 
contended that the district court both improperly instructed the jury and 
erroneously precluded Cisco from presenting evidence of its good faith 
belief in the invalidity of the patent.22  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded the trial for further proceedings.23  In its majority decision, the 
court concluded that the district court erred in instructing the jury that Cisco 
could be liable for “induced infringement based on mere negligence where 
knowledge is required.”24  Furthermore, the court held that a “good-faith 
belief of invalidity may negate the requisite intent for induced 
infringement” and thus is evidence to be considered by the fact-finder.25 
The dissent argued that belief as to the invalidity of a patent is 
irrelevant to the fact and law of infringement.26  “Such a belief, even if held 
in good faith, does not negate infringement of a valid and enforceable 
patent.”27  The dissent contended, however, that this belief “may be raised 
as a defense to willfulness of the infringement.”28  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to decide whether a good faith belief in invalidity is a 
defense to induced infringement under Section 271(b) of the Patent Act.29 
                                                          
 18.  Commil, 720 F.3d at 1364. 
 19.  Id. at 1365. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id.  The final judgment also granted $10.3 million in prejudgment interest and $17,738 in 
costs.  Id.   
 22.  Id.  Cisco also presented five other arguments: 1) the district court abused its discretion in 
granting a new trial; 2) the district court misconstrued the term “short-range communication 
protocol;” 3) there is insufficient evidence to sustain infringement; 4) Commil’s claims are 
indefinite, not enabled, and lacking adequate written description; and 5) the damages award based 
on Commil’s royalty base violates the entire market value rule.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 1364. 
 24.  Id. at 1367.  The disputed jury instruction permitted the jury to find inducement if “Cisco 
knew or should have known that its actions would induce actual infringement.”  Id. at 1366 
(quoting Joint Appendix at 6389, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (No. 2012-1042) (line numbers 98:24–99:2)).  
 25.  Id. at 1368−69. 
 26.  Id. at 1374 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id. at 1373. 
 29.  Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015). 
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Courts have historically struggled with uniformly articulating and 
applying the knowledge requirement for induced infringement liability.30  
Prior to the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act, the concept of induced 
infringement originated as a tool to infer intent for claims of contributory 
infringement.31  The conduct and knowledge alleged to induce infringement 
ranged from mere sale of a patented component to active encouragement of 
infringing behavior.32  These conflicting definitions of induced 
infringement reflected the judiciary’s simultaneous effort to balance 
interests of patent holders and that of the free marketplace.33  Disparate 
holdings eventually prompted legislative action to clarify the limits of 
contributory infringement in 1952.34 
Despite codification of induced infringement in the Patent Act, courts 
remained divided over the requisite knowledge and intent for a defendant to 
be held liable for inducement.35  In 2011, the Supreme Court finally settled 
this ongoing debate in Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A.36  Borrowing 
heavily from copyright law, the Global-Tech Court established a dual 
requirement by which the defendant must have knowledge of both the 
patent and infringement by a third party.37  Equipped with this new 
framework, courts presently face the task of navigating good faith defenses 
and their implications on the knowledge requirement of Section 271(b).38  
Given the frequent overlap of patent, copyright, and trademark law, a 
comparison of knowledge requirements for inducement among intellectual 
property is helpful in analyzing courts’ current approaches to good faith 
defenses.39 
A.  Indirect Infringement Functioned as Evidence of Contributory 
Infringement Before 1952 
Prior to legislative action in 1952, indirect infringement functioned as 
evidence of contributory infringement.40  Courts initially determined 
                                                          
 30.  See infra Part II.A−B. 
 31.  See generally Thomson-Houston Elec. v. Ohio Brass, 80 F. 712 (6th Cir. 1897) (noting 
that liability for contributory infringement will attach to defendants inducing or promoting 
unlawful combinations of patented products). 
 32.  See infra Part II.A. 
 33.  See infra Part II.A. 
 34.  See infra Part II.B. 
 35.  See infra Part II.B. 
 36.  131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
 37.  Id. at 2063. 
 38.  See infra Part II.C. 
 39.  See infra Part II.D. 
 40.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
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liability by examining potential uses of the alleged infringing product and 
active inducement by the defendant.41  Over time, however, liability for 
contributory infringement attached only to a defendant with the requisite 
knowledge.42  This element aided courts in not only targeting culpable 
parties but also curtailing the monopoly of patent owners over unpatented, 
unrestricted components and materials.43 
1.  Extension of Contributory Infringement Liability to Protect 
Patent Holders 
Early judicial decisions preceding the Patent Act categorized 
infringement as either “direct” or “contributory.”44  Liability for 
contributory infringement was developed “under a theory of joint 
tortfeasance, wherein one who intentionally caused or aided and abetted the 
commission of a tort by another was jointly and severally liable with the 
primary tortfeasor.”45 Consequently, model instances of contributory 
infringement occurred when a third party sold a component in a patented 
invention that lacked any noninfringing uses.  The primary case of Wallace 
v. Holmes46 established that one who makes or sells an unpatented 
component for the sole use in a patented combination or process can be held 
liable for infringement.47  The complainants’ patent in Wallace was for an 
improved lamp that consisted of a burner and a glass chimney.48  
Defendants argued that because they only made and sold the burner, they 
could not be held liable.49  The circuit court found, however, that the burner 
was not only the distinguishing feature of the lamp but also was “utterly 
useless” standing alone.50  In addition, the defendants exhibited their 
burner, furnished with a chimney, and recommended it to customers, thus 
“inducing the unlawful use of the complainants’ invention.”51 
Decisions following Wallace continued to impose liability where a 
component was useful only in a patented combination.52  In cases involving 
                                                          
 41.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 42.  See infra Parts II.A.1−2. 
 43.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 44.  Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468−69 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 45.  Id. at 1469 (first citing Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 
(6th Cir. 1897), and then citing Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200, 202–05 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1898)). 
 46.  29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100). 
 47.  Id. at 80. 
 48.  Id. at 79. 
 49.  Id. at 78−79. 
 50.  Id. at 79. 
 51.  Id. at 80. 
 52.  See, e.g., N.Y. Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 (8th Cir. 1915) (“One who 
makes and sells articles which are only adapted to be used in a patented combination will be 
presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts . . . .”). 
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components capable of both infringing and innocent uses, however, courts 
have found intent of contributory infringement only if the defendants 
engaged in active inducement, such as instructions or advertising.53  For 
instance, the circuit court in Weed Chain Tire Grip Co. v. Cleveland Chain 
& Manufacturing. Co.54 issued a preliminary injunction where defendants 
placed in the market, and advertised in circulars, a chain grip that was 
“substantially identical” to plaintiff’s patented grip.55  Conversely, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Edison Electric Light Co. v. Peninsular Light, 
Power & Heat Co.56 dismissed an action for patent infringement against a 
company that supplied electrical power “suitable for a great variety or 
methods of use” and sold by the defendant without intent that “it was to be 
used in an infringing way.”57 
In Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Kelsey Electric Railway Specialty 
Co.,58 the Connecticut Circuit Court extended the “intent” element of 
contributory infringement to include knowledge and indifference as to the 
consequences of one’s acts.59  On appeal, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit inferred a proposed concert of action 
between the Kelsey Company and the infringers given that the defendants 
were willing “to sell to any and all purchasers, irrespective of their 
character as infringers.”60  Moreover, the court in Kelsey asserted that 
defendants have a “duty of careful investigation” as to the character of their 
purchasers and “an abandonment of indifference as to whether they are 
seeking” to infringe upon the rights of the patent owner.61 
Ambiguities embedded in the Kelsey decision surfaced in the 1898 
case of Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, signaling the first restriction 
of contributory infringement liability.62  The court observed that “[t]he 
doctrine that one who furnishes materials, knowing their proposed use [is a 
tort], becomes thereby a tortfeasor . . . is certainly novel.”63  Rather, the 
court argued, joint and several liability depends “upon the meaning attached 
                                                          
 53.  See, e.g., Graham Paper Co. v. Int’l Paper Co., 46 F.2d 881, 886 (8th Cir. 1931) (finding 
liability where a defendant made “sales of mulch paper adapted for use in accordance with the 
methods covered by both patents, and was expressly recommending and explaining to purchasers 
how to make use of the paper in accordance with those methods”). 
 54.  196 F. 213 (C.C.D. Ohio 1910).  
 55.  Id. at 214–15.  
 56.  101 F. 831 (6th Cir. 1900). 
 57.  Id. at 833. 
 58.  72 F. 1016 (C.C.D. Conn. 1896) (relying on Travers v. Beyer, 26 F. 450 (C.C.N.Y. 
1886)). 
 59.  Id. at 1018.  
 60.  Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Ry. Specialty Co.,75 F. 1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 
1896). 
 61.  Id. at 1010. 
 62.  93 F. 200 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898). 
 63.  Id. at 202.  
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to the words ‘participation,’ ‘aiding,’ and ‘abetting.’”64  The court 
concluded that the knowledge element of contributory infringement 
included knowledge of not only the physical destination of the infringing 
product but also of the patent.65  Moreover, “a defendant will be restrained 
only . . . after it has been judicially determined” that the patent is valid and 
his action is a tort.66   
2.  Curtailment of Contributory Infringement Liability to Balance 
the Rights of Patentees and the Free Marketplace 
Gradual efforts by courts to curtail the monopoly of patent owners 
over unpatented components and materials accompanied adjudications of 
contributory infringement claims in the twentieth century.67  Courts began 
to start protecting “the free sale and use of unpatented articles of trade and 
commerce.”68  Before 1917, courts extended contributory infringement 
remedies to the enforcement of patent restrictions on the use of unpatented 
materials and supplies.69  The Supreme Court affirmed this notion in Henry 
v. A.B. Dick Co.70  Although the Court opined that inferring liability from a 
mere sale of potentially infringing components “would block the wheels of 
commerce,” it nevertheless held liable a licensee who violated use 
restrictions of a patented device.71  Five years later, however, the Supreme 
Court overruled Henry, recognizing its potential to grant patent owners an 
unbridled monopoly.72  In Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
Manufacturing Co.,73 the Court held: 
[T]he exclusive right granted in every patent must be limited to 
the invention described in the claims of the patent and . . . it is not 
                                                          
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 203. 
 66.  Id. at 205.  
 67.  See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co., v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 
(1917) (“[T]he patentee receives nothing from the law which he did not have before, and that the 
only effect of his patent is to restrain others from manufacturing, using or selling that which he 
has invented.  The patent law simply protects him in the monopoly of that which he has invented 
and has described in the claims of his patent.” (first citing United States. v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 
U.S. 224, 239 (1897); then citing Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 
(1908); and then citing Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913))).   
 68.  Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Errett, 297 F. 733, 739 (2d Cir. 1924). 
 69.  See Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 296 (6th 
Cir. 1896) (“The monopoly in the unpatented staple results as an incident from the monopoly in 
the use of complainant’s invention, and is therefore a legitimate result of the patentee’s control 
over the use of his invention by others.”). 
 70.  224 U.S. 1, 31−32 (1912). 
 71.  Id. at 48–49.  The complainant sold his patented “Rotary Mimeograph” under a license 
restriction that the machine be used only with unpatented stencil paper, ink, and other supplies 
sold by the complainant.  Id. at 11.  
 72.  Motion Picture Patents Co., v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917). 
 73.  243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
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competent for the owner of a patent by notice attached to its 
machine to, in effect, extend the scope of its patent monopoly by 
restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its operation but 
which are no part of the patented invention . . . .74 
Despite this holding, the doctrine of contributory infringement 
continued to be misconceived and misapplied.75  Congress enacted the 
Patent Act in 1952 after the Supreme Court in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Inv. Co. urged Congress to “define the appropriate limits of the 
doctrine of contributory infringement.”76 
B.  Following the Patent Act of 1952, Courts Uniformly Imposed a 
Knowledge Requirement for Induced Infringement 
The Patent Act’s division of indirect liability into induced Section 
271(b) infringment and contributory Section 271(c) infringement aimed to 
stabilize and clarify the law.77  Section 271(b) provides that, “[w]hoever 
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”78  
Although Section 271(b) does not incorporate “the word ‘knowingly,’ [the 
Federal Circuit] uniformly imposed a knowledge requirement.”79  
Generally, courts looked for a “specific intent,” rather than mere knowledge 
of possible infringement by others, to prove contributory infringement.80  
This intent, however, materialized in different forms among the circuit 
courts, which remained divided over the requisite level of intent.81  After 
decades of diverse decisions, the Supreme Court resolved the split in 
                                                          
 74.  Id. at 516.   
 75.  See generally Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (calling for the definition of the appropriate limits of the doctrine of 
contributory infringement to prevent its further misapplication). 
 76.  Id.   
 77.  See generally Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 203−04 (1980) 
(“[A]lthough the general purpose of the Act was to clarify existing law, it also included several 
changes . . . .  In explaining the provisions of § 271, the Reports stated that they were intended ‘to 
codify in statutory form the principles of contributory infringement and at the same time [to] 
eliminate [the] doubt and confusion’ that had resulted from ‘decisions of the courts in recent 
years.’” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952))). 
 78.  35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).  
 79.  Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (first 
citing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1988); and then citing C.R. 
Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. 911 F.2d 670 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see also Water 
Techs. Corp., 850 F.2d at 668 (“Although section 271(b) does not use the word ‘knowing,’ the 
case law and legislative history uniformly assert such a requirement.” (citing 4 D. CHISUM, 
PATENTS §§ 17.-04[2], [3] (1984))). 
 80.  See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc.,  917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(“It must be established that the defendant possessed specific intent to encourage another’s 
infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute 
inducement.”). 
 81.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
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Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., concluding that induced 
infringement requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent 
infringement.82 
1. A Lack of Clarity Exists in the Federal Circuit Regarding the 
Required Level of Intent 
While the “specific intent” element of Section 271(b) was firmly 
established in case law, “there [remained] a lack of clarity concerning 
whether the required intent must be merely to induce the specific acts or 
additionally to cause an infringement.”83  This splinter arose from two 1990 
Federal Circuit decisions reaching contrasting results: Hewlett-Packard Co. 
v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.84 and Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, 
Inc.85 
In Hewlett-Packard, defendant Bausch & Lomb sold a license for an 
infringing product to a third party and indemnified that party for patent 
liability.86  Subsequently, Hewlett-Packard sued Bausch & Lomb for 
induced infringement.87  The court opined that while Section 271(b) does 
not mention intent on its face, “proof of actual intent to cause [infringing 
acts] is a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.”88  Manville, 
on the other hand, articulated a stricter standard.89  The inducement claim 
arose after an employee at Paramount circulated a drawing of the plaintiff’s 
patented product, which was subsequently used by the defendant to make 
and sell the infringing product.90  In rejecting the claim, the court found that 
knowledge of the alleged infringing conduct was insufficient; rather, “[t]he 
plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged infringer’s actions 
induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions 
would induce actual infringements.”91 
Federal Circuit and district court opinions continued to struggle with 
this division of authority up until, and even after, the en banc DSU Medical 
                                                          
 82.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 83.  Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(first citing Manville Sales Corp., 917 F.2d at 553; and then citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch 
& Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1424, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 84.  909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 85.  917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 86.  Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1467. 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id. at 1469 (citing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco Ltd., 850 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 89.  Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc.,  917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  
 90.  Id. at 549.   
 91.  Id. at 553 (first citing Water Techs., 850 F.2d at 668; then citing Hewlett-Packard, 909 
F.2d at 1468–69; and then citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 
476, 488 (1964)). 
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Corp. v. JMS Co.92 decision in 2006.93  Plaintiffs DSU Medical Corporation 
and Medisystems Corporation held a patent for a guarded, winged-needle 
assembly that reduced the risk of accidental needle-stick injuries.94  
Defendants sold an identical needle guard, but as a “stand-alone” product 
without a needle attached.95  The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
the Manville standard.96  Under this standard, a plaintiff must show that the 
alleged infringer knew of the patent and that she knew or should have 
known her actions would induce actual infringement.97  The court in DSU 
Medical ultimately held that although the defendant was aware of plaintiffs’ 
patent, it had relied on advice from both the U.S. patent counsel and 
attorneys that its product was noninfringing.98  Therefore, the defendant 
lacked specific intent.99  In formulating this conclusion, the court also relied 
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in a case of induced copyright 
infringement,  Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.100  In Grokster, the Supreme 
Court asserted that, “[t]he inducement rule . . . premises liability on 
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct.”  As such, specific intent is 
evidenced by “affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.”101 
2.  Resolution of the Intent Requirement in Global-Tech 
In the 2011 decision Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., the 
Supreme Court addressed Section 271(b) for the first time and concluded 
that induced infringement requires knowledge that the induced acts 
constitute patent infringement.102  The facts of the case surround a “cool-
touch” deep fryer patented by SEB S.A.103  In 1997, Sunbeam Products, 
Inc., a U.S. competitor of SEB, commissioned Global-Tech Appliances’ 
Hong Kong subsidiary, Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd., to supply it with deep 
fryers meeting certain specifications.104  Pentalpha copied the cosmetic 
features of an SEB fryer and sold the product to Sunbeam; in turn, Sunbeam 
                                                          
 92.  471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 93.  See, e.g., Jamison v. Olin Corp.-Winchester Div., No. 03-1036-KI, 2005 WL 7213838, at 
*12 (D. Or. Oct. 4, 2005) (“But what is it that the inducer must have intended?  Quite remarkably, 
this remains, in Federal Circuit jurisprudence and elsewhere, the major unanswered question about 
§ 271(b).”). 
 94.  DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1297. 
 95.  Id. at 1298. 
 96.  Id. at 1304. 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  Id. at 1307. 
 99.  Id.  
 100.  545 U.S. 913 (2005); DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1305.  
 101.  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937.   
 102.  131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).  
 103.  Id. at 2063. 
 104.  Id. at 2064. 
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resold them in the United States at a lower price point.105  For inducing 
Sunbeam to infringe, SEB brought suit against Pentalpha.106 
In its decision, the Supreme Court noted that both the statutory text 
and case law lack a definitive articulation of the knowledge requirement.107  
The Court ultimately invoked its decision in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. 
Convertible Top Replacement Co. (“Aro II”),108 which is now a fixture of 
contributory infringement.109  In Aro II, the Supreme Court held that a 
violator “must know ‘that the combination for which his component was 
especially designed was both patented and infringing.’”110  Considering the 
historical connection of contributory and induced infringement, the Global-
Tech Court felt compelled to apply the same knowledge requirement for 
Section 271(c) to 271(b).111  Accordingly, the Court held that induced 
infringement requires knowledge of the patent and knowledge that the 
induced acts constitute patent infringement.112 
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the proper doctrine to 
determine knowledge is that of “willful blindness” developed in criminal 
law.113  The doctrine requires that: (1) “the defendant . . . subjectively 
believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists” and (2) that “the 
defendant . . . take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”114  
Under this formulation, a willfully blind defendant can be said to know the 
critical facts that translate into the requisite intent for induced 
infringement.115 
                                                          
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 2065. 
 108.  377 U.S. 476 (1964). 
 109.  Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011). 
 110.  Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964). 
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Id. at 2068. 
 113.  Id.  
 114.  Id. at 2070 (first citing United States v. Perez–Melendez, 599 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2010); 
then citing United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 477–78 (2d Cir. 2003); then citing United 
States v. Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 257 (3d Cir. 2010); then citing United States v. Schnabel, 939 
F.2d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 1991); then citing United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 
2005); then citing United States v. Holloway, 731 F.2d 378, 380–81 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); 
then citing United States v. Draves, 103 F.3d 1328, 1333 (7th Cir. 1997); then citing United States 
v. Florez, 368 F.3d 1042, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004); then citing United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 
917, 920 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); then citing United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639, 643 (10th Cir. 
1983); then citing United States v. Perez–Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1564 (11th Cir. 1994); and then 
citing United States v. Alston–Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 339–41 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
 115.  Id. at 2070−71. 
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C.  Subjective Good Faith Defenses May Negate the Requisite Intent 
for Induced Infringement Liability 
A demonstration of a good faith, subjective belief by the defendant 
may preclude a finding of liability for induced infringement.116  Many of 
these subjective defenses stem from good faith yet misplaced reliance on 
advice of counsel as to noninfringement and invalidity of a patent.117  
Ultimately, a court will consider the defense, if at all, under a totality of the 
circumstances standard.118 
1.  Advice of Counsel 
Parties invoking subjective belief as a defense to infringement liability 
often rely on advice of counsel.119  In order to demonstrate a lack of the 
requisite intent to infringe, a party need “not only to show an opinion from 
competent counsel [as to noninfringement or invalidity] but also that it had 
exercised reasonable and good faith adherence to the analysis and advice 
therein.”120  In the same vein, “intentional disregard of . . . counsel’s 
opinion negates any inference of good faith, placing [a party] in the same 
position as one who failed to secure the advice of counsel.”121  Moreover, 
parties who fail to “obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the 
initiation of any possible infringing activity” or proceed upon a biased 
opinion will have trouble demonstrating good faith reliance.122 
For example, the court in Manville found that Paramount’s actions did 
not amount to knowledge, given that the company was “not aware of 
[plaintiff’s] patent until suit was filed, and that [its] subsequent infringing 
acts continued upon . . . [a] ‘good faith belief,’ based on advice of counsel, 
that [its] product did not infringe.”123  Similarly, the court in DSU Medical 
Corp. held that since defendants demonstrated reliance on opinions of non-
infringement from U.S. patent counsel, they did not believe or intend to be 
                                                          
 116.  See infra Part II.C.1−2. 
 117.  See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 118.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 119.  See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 109 F.R.D. 121, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (“The central issue on which . . . testimony [from counsel for Universal] would have been 
relevant was whether Universal initiated this action in ‘good faith.’”). 
 120.  Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 121.  Id. (citing Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc’ns, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 665 (10th 
Cir. 1980)). 
 122.  Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (first citing Gen. Elec., Co. v. Sciaky Bros., 415 F.2d 1068, 1073–74 (1969); and then citing 
Marvel Specialty Co. v. Bell Hosiery Mills, Inc., 386 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1967)). 
 123.  Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing 
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1291, 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1989)).  
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infringing.124  On the other hand, the court in Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. 
Hormel & Co. found the defendant Hormel liable for induced infringement 
after it consciously disregarded recommendation by counsel to create a 
product substantially different from the patented product.125  The court 
opined that Hormel, although on notice of Central Soya’s patent rights, 
ignored its affirmative duty to exercise due care and thus possessed 
sufficient intent to infringe.126 
While not as prevalent as opinions of noninfringement, advice of 
counsel as to patent invalidity has also surfaced in several decisions.  In 
Kolmes v. World Elastic Corp.,127 the Middle District of North Carolina 
asserted that defendants, who after consulting counsel maintained a good 
faith belief in the invalidity of the patent in suit, “did not possess the 
requisite specific intent . . . for actively inducing infringement.”128  
Moreover, the district court in VNUS Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Diomed 
Holdings, Inc.129 denied summary judgment of induced infringement where 
“each defendant . . . offered evidence that it sought and obtained the opinion 
of counsel, who . . . provided an opinion . . . [that] the patents were 
invalid.”130  Although advice of counsel regarding noninfringement or 
invalidity weigh in favor of a determination of good faith, many courts do 
not think reliance on advice of counsel is dispositive.131 
2.  Totality of the Circumstances Standard 
Reliance on competent legal advice is only one of several steps 
potential infringers must take to exercise due care and thus demonstrate the 
good faith of their actions.132  A consideration of the totality of the 
circumstances is necessary “in determining whether a reasonable person 
                                                          
 124.  471 F.3d 1293, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc); see also Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl 
USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 649 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding opinion of counsel regarding non-
infringement “admissible, at least with respect to [defendant]’s state of mind and its bearing on 
indirect infringement.” (citing DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1307)). 
 125.  723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 126.  Id.  
 127.  No. 4:93CV00719, 1995 WL 918081 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 18, 1995), aff’d sub nom. Kolmes 
v. World Fibers Corp., 107 F.3d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 128.  Id. at *10 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994)). 
 129.  No. C-05-2972 MMC, 2007 WL 2900532, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007). 
 130.  Id. at *1; see also DataQuill Ltd. v. High Tech Comput. Corp., 887 F.Supp.2d 999, 
1012−13 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (indicating that a belief of invalidity may present a triable issue of fact 
as to intent to induce infringement). 
 131.  Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  
 132.  See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sciaky Bros., 415 F.2d 1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 1969) 
(recognizing that “a good-faith opinion by competent and independent patent counsel may be 
important evidence to be weighed on the issue of ‘honest doubt’ of patent validity” but it was not 
conclusive (first citing Cont’l Can Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 362 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 
1966); and then citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg., Co., 282 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 
1960))). 
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would prudently conduct himself with any confidence that the courts might 
hold the patent invalid” or conduct noninfringing.133  The court in Ecolab, 
Inc. v. FMC Corp.134 found such reasonable belief where the accused party 
regarded its product as falling outside the scope of the patent.135  Therefore, 
the jury reasonably concluded that Ecolab lacked the intent required for 
induced infringement.136  Similarly, defendants in Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. 
Blue Sky Medical Group, Inc.137 avoided liability because they reasonably 
believed their product was an invention freely found in the public 
domain.138 
3.  Negative Opinions Regarding Good Faith Defenses 
Several decisions purport a complete eradication of subjective belief 
from the intent analysis.  By following the standard set forth in Hewlett-
Packard, the district court in Sandisk Corp. v. Lexar Media, Inc.139 rejected 
Lexar’s argument that a plaintiff must prove as a matter of law that the 
defendant subjectively believed its actions were infringing.140  In Nordberg 
Manufacturing Co. v. Jackson Vibrators, Inc.,141 the defendant claimed that 
although he was aware of the patent’s existence, he did not know his 
operations infringed on those protected rights.142  The court doubted the 
proposition that liability for contributory infringement could be avoided 
when an alleged infringer “arrives at its own independent judgment on the 
legal question of non-infringement;” this would leave a patentee 
unprotected until the conclusion of litigation.143  These decisions reflect 
how some courts may view subjective, good faith defenses as liability 
loopholes and thus resist their implementation. 
                                                          
 133.  Cent. Soya Co., 723 F.2d at 1577 (citing Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen 
Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 134.  569 F.3d 1335, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 135.  Id. at 1351.  
 136.  Id. 
 137.  554 F.3d 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 138.  Id. at 1025; see also Oplus Techs., Ltd. v. Sears Holdings Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
145917, at *21−22 (C.D. Ca. Oct. 2, 2013) (finding defendants’ subjective belief of 
noninfringement held in good faith given the numerous other methods available to perform the 
patented process).  
 139.  91 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (N.D.Cal. 2000). 
 140.  Id. at 1335. 
 141.  No. 63 C 2250, 1967 WL 7708 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 1967), rev’d, 393 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 
1968). 
 142.  Id. at *7. 
 143.  Id.  
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D.  Intent for Induced Infringement and Applicability of Good Faith 
Defenses Within Patent Law Function Similarly in Copyright and 
Trademark Law 
Intellectual property law—patent, trademark, and copyright law—
share similar approaches to both induced infringement and good faith 
defenses.144  Like patent law, trademark and copyright law demand a 
showing of “specific intent” to impose liability for induced infringement.145  
Moreover, the merit of subjective, good faith defenses aid courts in 
determining the “willfulness” of alleged infringers.146 
1.  Intent for Induced Infringement in Copyright and Trademark 
Law 
Cases of copyright and trademark induced infringement demand a 
similar level of knowledge to impose liability.147  For instance, legislative 
history of the Copyright Act supports that mere “evidence of reproduction 
or distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to 
establish willful infringement.”148  Upon passage of the 1997 amendment, 
Senator Hatch clarified that, “‘willful’ ought to mean the intent to violate a 
known legal duty.”149  In the aforementioned Grokster opinion, the 
Supreme Court adapted the inducement rule to impose liability on 
distributors whose words and deeds “show[] a purpose to cause and profit 
from third-party acts of copyright infringement.”150  The Grokster Court 
clarified that such purpose cannot arise from mere knowledge of a product’s 
characteristics or that it might be put to infringing use, but rather a higher 
level of intent.151 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. 
Liu,152 recently explored the intent requirement for trafficking counterfeit 
                                                          
 144.  See infra Part II.D.1−2. 
 145.  See infra Part II.D.1. 
 146.  See infra Part II.D.2. 
 147.  See, e.g., Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420−21 (1st Cir. 
2007) (“[C]opyright liability could be premised on a theory of active inducement of infringement, 
so that ‘one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as 
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the 
resulting acts of infringement by third parties.’” (quoting MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 913, 936−37 (2005))).   
 148.  17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2012).  See generally 143 CONG. REC. S12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 
1997) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (noting that the Act does not intent to include persons who 
honestly believed they were not infringing). 
 149.  143 CONG. REC. S12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
 150.  MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005). 
 151.  Id. at 935. 
 152.  731 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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labels.153  The defendant Liu commercially replicated CDs and DVDs on a 
large scale without permission from the copyright holder.154  Nevertheless, 
the court declined to impose liability.155  The government could not prove 
that the “defendant knew he was acting illegally rather than simply that he 
knew he was making copies.”156  Despite acknowledging “the general 
rule . . . that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense,” the Liu 
court opted for a higher intent requirement.157  Given that average citizens 
may not readily comprehend the complicated structure of modern statutes 
and regulations, the government must prove “specific intent.”158 
Trademark cases have similarly extended liability “beyond those who 
actually mislabel goods with the mark of another.”159  Despite lacking 
direct control over the chain of distribution, manufacturers and suppliers 
who intentionally induce others to infringe a patent will be contributorily 
responsible for any resulting harms.160  This intent required in trademark 
law falls at a lower standard than patent and copyright law.  A finding of 
induced infringement in trademark will impute liability to defendants 
supplying “its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is 
engaging in trademark infringement.”161 
2.  Good Faith Defenses 
While defenses premised on subjective belief rarely preclude liability 
in cases of copyright and trademark infringement, such defenses do play a 
central role in determining the “willfulness” of a defendant’s conduct.162  
Exceptional cases in which a defendant engages in “‘malicious,’ 
‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ or ‘willful’” conduct may result in attorney’s fees 
for the prevailing party.163  Attorney’s fees are inappropriate, however, 
                                                          
 153.  Id. at 985. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at 989 (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199–200 (1991)). 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982). 
 160.  Id. at 853−54.  
 161.  Id. (first citing William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 285 U.S. 526 (1924); and 
then citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980 (Mass. 1946), aff’d, 
162 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1946)). 
 162.  See, e.g., Buca di Bacco, Inc. v. Buca di Bacc’, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 31, 32 (S.D. Tex. 
1993) (“[A] case may not be exceptional, even when deliberate copying occurs, if ‘the party 
presents what it in good faith believes may be a legitimate defense.’” (quoting CJC Holdings, Inc. 
v. Wright & Lato, Inc., 979 F.2d 60, 66 (5th Cir. 1992))).   
 163.  Martin’s Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296, 1305 
(5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Tex. Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l, Inc., 951 F.2d 684, 697 
(5th Cir. 1992)). 
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“where the infringer believed in good faith that he could lawfully use the 
plaintiff[’s]” product.164 
Moreover, subjectivity is highly relevant in analyzing the potential 
fraudulency of trademark application oaths.  In a case before the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board, California pizza company Woodstock’s 
Enterprises, Inc. alleged that an Oregon-based company bearing the same 
name obtained its registration knowing that the mark “Woodstock’s” was 
already used by the petitioner.165  In denying the allegation, the Board noted 
that application oaths are “phrased in terms of a subjective belief, thereby 
making it extremely difficult to prove fraud so long as the signer had an 
honestly held, good faith belief.”166  Given a reasonably held and honest, 
although incorrect, good faith belief that a party is the senior user of the 
registered mark, a defendant will escape liability for trademark fraud.167 
In light of seemingly well-established intent requirements for induced 
infringement liability among intellectual property law, there remains 
disparate treatment of subjective good faith defenses.168  Consequently, 
both patent holders and courts struggle with adequately protecting patent 
rights.169  In order to provide more transparency to the patent market, the 
Supreme Court was forced to established a uniform approach to subjective, 
good faith defenses.170 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court 
vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit and held that a defendant’s 
good faith belief regarding patent validity was not a defense to a claim of 
induced infringement.171  Relying on the long-accepted truth that “[v]alidity 
and infringement are distinct issues, bearing different burdens, different 
presumptions, and different evidence,” the Court declined to recognize a 
good faith belief of invalidity as negating the scienter requirement for 
induced infringement under Section 271(b).172 
The Court began its analysis by reaffirming the decision in Global-
Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,173 which held that, “liability for induced 
                                                          
 164.  Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Lee, 547 F. Supp. 2d 667, 681 (W.D. Tex. 2008). 
 165.  Woodstock’s Enters. (Calif.) v. Woodstock’s Enters. (Ore.), 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440, 
1443 (T.T.A.B. 1997). 
 166.  Id. at 1444. 
 167.  Id. at 1444–45.  
 168.  See supra Part II.C. 
 169.  See supra Part II. 
 170.  See infra Part III. 
 171.  135 S. Ct. 1920, 1922 (2015). 
 172.  Id. at 1929 (quoting Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1374 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (Newman, J., dissenting)).   
 173.  563 U.S. 754 (2011). 
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infringement can only attach if the defendant knew of the patent and knew 
as well that ‘the induced acts constitute patent infringement.’”174  Contrary 
to assertions made by Commil and the Government in its supporting amicus 
brief, the Court emphasized that inducement liability requires a higher 
mental state and thus proof that the defendant knew the acts were 
infringing.175 
In light of this twofold scienter requirement, the Court then considered 
whether a defendant’s belief regarding patent validity is a defense to a claim 
of induced infringement.176 Through analysis of precedent177 and the 
organization of the Patent Act,178 the Court determined that infringement 
and validity are distinct issues; thus, “permitting a defense of belief in 
invalidity . . . would conflate [the two].”179  Moreover, the Court contended 
that allowing this new defense would undermine the core presumption 
presented in the Patent Act and case law that a patent is “presumed 
valid.”180  If a defendant could prevail by reasonably proving his belief in 
invalidity, the Court argued, he would circumvent the high standard of clear 
and convincing evidence chosen by Congress.181  Consequently, the Court 
regarded invalidity as an affirmative defense to liability for otherwise 
infringing conduct, not infringement itself.182 
The Court also indicated several practical reasons not to create a 
defense based on a good faith belief in invalidity.183  For instance, the Court 
pointed to other methods available to accused inducers wishing to 
invalidate a patent, such as filing a declaratory judgment action or seeking 
inter partes review at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.184  In addition, the 
Court claimed that the defense could render litigation more burdensome.185  
According to the Court, every accused inducer would be incentivized to put 
forth a theory of invalidity, resulting in increased discovery costs and a 
                                                          
 174.  Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1926 (quoting Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. 
Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011)).  
 175.  Id. at 1927−28.  
 176.  Id. at 1928.  
 177.  See, e.g., Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 96 (1993) (“A party 
seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity presents a claim independent of the patentee’s charge 
of infringement.”). 
 178.  Part III of the Act relates to “Patents and Protection of Patent Rights,” including the 
protection from infringement, while Part II, “Patentability of Inventions and Grants of Patents,” 
defines what constitutes a valid patent.  Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–212, 
251–329 (2012)). 
 179.  Id.  
 180.  Id. at 1929 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012)). 
 181.  Id. (citing Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245–47 (2011)). 
 182.  Id.  
 183.  Id.  
 184.  Id. (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007)). 
 185.  Id.  
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higher likelihood that the defendant will prevail.186  Lastly, the Court 
rejected the defense in light of general principles, such as an act being 
“intentional” for purposes of civil liability despite the actor lacking actual 
knowledge and “that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense 
to criminal prosecution.”187 
At the conclusion of its opinion, the majority stressed the importance 
of dissuading frivolous claims made by companies wielding patents as “a 
sword to go after defendants for money.”188  Through safeguards outlined 
by the Court, such as sanctioning attorneys and awarding fees to prevailing 
parties, courts can ensure the abatement of this tactic.189  The Court argued 
that these precautions, along with the other avenues available to dispute 
validity, “militate in favor of maintaining the separation . . . between 
infringement and validity.”190  As such, the Court concluded that a belief in 
invalidity is no defense to a claim of induced infringement.191 
In dissent, Justice Scalia agreed that Section 271(b) requires 
knowledge of the infringing nature of the induced acts but disagreed with 
the majority’s holding.192  He argued that only valid patents confer 
exclusive rights susceptible to infringement.193  Consequently, “anyone 
with a good-faith belief in a patent’s invalidity necessarily believes the 
patent cannot be infringed” and thus lacks the scienter element necessary 
for induced infringement.194  The majority’s arguments contrary to this 
position, Justice Scalia opined, were unpersuasive.195  First, Justice Scalia 
asserted that while infringement and validity are separate issues, this 
distinction is irrelevant.196 “Recognizing that infringement requires 
validity” would not conflate the issues.197  Furthermore, a defense based on 
a good faith belief in invalidity would not undermine the statutory 
presumption of validity.198  An accused inducer who succeeds with this 
                                                          
 186.  Id. at 1929–30 (citing Nathan A. Sloan, Think It Is Invalid?  A New Defense to Negate 
Intent for Induced Infringement, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 613, 618 (2013)). 
 187.  Id. at 1930 (first quoting Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A., 
559 U.S. 573, 582–83 (2010); and then quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 
(1991)).  
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. at 1930–31 (first citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11; then citing 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012); and 
then citing Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755–56 
(2014)). 
 190.  Id. at 1931. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 193.  Id.  
 194.  Id.  
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. (quoting id. at 1928 (majority opinion)). 
 198.  Id.  
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defense, he explained, would merely escape liability, not call into question 
that patent’s validity.199 
Lastly, Justice Scalia noted that the Court does not create defenses but 
rather interprets the Patent Act to decide whether a defense is sound.200  The 
Patent Act, Justice Scalia points out, requires knowledge of infringement 
for induced infringement liability.201  Given that “there can be no 
infringement (and hence no knowledge of infringement) of an invalid 
patent[, a] good-faith belief in invalidity is a defense.”202  Therefore, Justice 
Scalia urged that proper interpretation of the Patent Act calls for the 
acceptance of a good faith belief of invalidity as a viable defense to induced 
infringement.203 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court found 
that invalidity was a defense to liability, not to infringement.  The Supreme 
Court therefore held that a belief as to invalidity could not negate the 
scienter required for induced infringement.204  Although the Commil Court 
reached the appropriate conclusion, its reasoning was misguided.205  The 
majority shaped its argument primarily around the structural and historical 
separation of “validity” and “infringement” under patent law.206  This 
tenuous distinction, however, poses logistical hurdles for courts and 
scholars alike.207 
The Commil Court could have further clarified the existing intent 
requirement by including the following policy rationales that support 
Section 271(b).208  Both the judiciary and the legislature have made 
extensive efforts to formulate an intent requirement for induced 
infringement that favors protection of patentees and the free marketplace 
equally.209  Permitting a good faith defense in invalidity would not only 
obfuscate infringement claims against potential inducers but also could 
permit defendants to evade liability entirely.210  Furthermore, the policy 
justifications behind induced infringement closely resemble inducement in 
                                                          
 199.  Id. at 1932. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id.  
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id.  
 204.  Id. at 1931 (majority opinion). 
 205.  See infra Part IV. 
 206.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 207.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 208.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 209.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 210.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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copyright and trademark law.211  By making this correlation, the Commil 
Court would have made additional strides in aligning the doctrines of 
intellectual property law.212  Given the current pattern of judicial cross-
application of these doctrines, this result would facilitate the ability of 
courts to seek guidance from other areas of intellectual property law.213  
With this alternative line of reasoning, the Supreme Court’s holding would 
have also furnished further clarity and consistency to both patent law and 
intellectual property law as a whole.214 
A.  The Tenuous Distinction Between “Infringement” and “Validity” 
Provides a Weak Foundation for the Holding in Commil 
The crux of the Supreme Court’s decision in Commil, distinguishing 
“infringement” and “validity” as separate issues, provided a weak 
foundation for the ultimate holding.  The Commil Court attempted to clarify 
the “axiom” articulated by the Federal Circuit—“that one cannot infringe an 
invalid patent.”215  In doing so, the majority itself acknowledged that “[t]o 
say that an invalid patent cannot be infringed, or that someone cannot be 
induced to infringe an invalid patent, is in one sense a simple truth, both as 
a matter of logic and semantics.”216  Nevertheless, the Court maintained that 
the two issues are entirely distinct.217  This language alone reflects two 
competing representations of the relationship between “infringement” and 
“validity.”  On one hand, as endorsed in Commil, infringement and validity 
are independent claims.  On the other hand, infringement logistically 
presupposes the existence of a valid patent.  Given the following range of 
influential evidence on both sides of this argument, this controversial 
distinction ultimately undermines the Supreme Court’s reasoning. 
The structure of the Patent Act and prior case law demonstrate “the 
long-accepted truth . . . that infringement and invalidity are separate matters 
under patent law.”218  First, the Patent Act of 1952 incorporates two 
chapters, “Infringement of Patents”219 and “Remedies for Infringement of 
                                                          
 211.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 212.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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 214.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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Patent, and Other Actions,”220 into Part III of Title 35, “Patents and 
Protection of Patent Rights.”221  While the former chapter defines what 
constitutes infringement of a patent,222 the latter chapter pertains to defenses 
to liability, including those based on invalidity.223  By separating the 
statutory requirements for both, Congress presumably intended for the 
issues to remain separate.  Second, precedent similarly purports that the two 
claims are independent, serving as “alternative grounds” for dismissing 
suits.224 
Moreover, the issue of infringement is “capable of determination 
without regard to its validity.”225  To determine infringement, courts 
compare the asserted patent claims, regardless of validity, to the accused 
products or process.226  Validity, however, is governed by separate tests.  
Preliminarily, a patent is presumed valid; next, “the party attacking validity 
has the burden of proving facts supporting a conclusion of invalidity by 
clear and convincing evidence.”227  A defendant can argue invalidity on 
several grounds, including anticipation, obviousness, indefiniteness, and 
insufficient description.228  In addition, most courts consider deciding 
validity and infringement independently a better practice “to avert 
unnecessary remand in the event” claims are held valid on appeal.229  
Consequently, “[c]ourts constantly hold claims infringed but invalid.”230 
Conversely, the Patent Act and prior case law equally demonstrate that 
a finding of infringement presupposes patent validity.231  For instance, 
Section 271(b) defines induced infringement by referring to a patent being 
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(N.D. Ala. 1962) (“Logically, it would seem since infringement presupposes validity that validity 
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infringed.232  As implemented in Section 271, a “patent” is not merely a 
paper certificate, but rather “the conferral of rights in a particular claimed 
set of elements.”233  Those rights exist under a valid patent that entitle its 
holder to privileges bestowed by the Patent Act.234  This interpretation 
coincides with the understanding of “infringement” in Black’s Law 
Dictionary—“[a]n act that interferes with one of the exclusive rights of a 
patent.”235  In addition, the Committee on the Judiciary noted that an 
explicit definition of “infringement” within the Patent Act was unnecessary 
since the granting clause Section 154(a)(1) already “creates certain 
exclusive rights and infringement would be any violation of those rights.”236 
Both before and after the enactment of the Patent Act, courts regularly 
recognized that invalidity renders patent claims void.237  In Linde Air 
Products Co. v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co.,238 the Second Circuit 
asserted as a “plain principle that there can be no such thing as infringement 
of an invalid patent.”239  Almost ninety years later, the court in Prima Tek 
II, LLC v. Polypap, S.A.R.L.,240 upheld the same concept with regards to 
induced infringement.241  After rendering a judgment of invalidity, the 
Prima Tek court, like many others, considered the cross-claim of 
infringement moot.242  Given the vastly disparate characterizations of the 
relationship between validity and infringement, the Commil Court should 
have placed less emphasis on the distinction and more on the underlying 
policy. 
B.  A Good Faith Belief in Invalidity Defense Contravenes the 
Purposes and Policies Underlying 35 U.S.C. Section 271(b) 
Creating a new good faith belief in invalidity defense to inducement 
would undermine the purposes and policies underlying Section 271(b) for 
two reasons.  First, a good faith belief in invalidity functions as a complete 
defense.  Consequently, a good faith belief deprives patent owners of a 
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meaningful remedy against actors who game the defense by inducing third 
parties to directly infringe while evading the “the actual knowledge 
standard set forth in Global-Tech.”243  Second, including yet another 
subjective defense to induced infringement overextends an intent 
requirement that already sufficiently protects innocent defendants. 
Congress codified an indirect infringement in order “[t]o provide for 
the protection of patent rights where enforcement against direct infringers is 
impracticable.”244  During the consideration of the 1952 Patent Act, primary 
drafter Mr. Giles Rich explained that the practical way to stop infringement 
“by a large number of scattered individuals all of whom have been caused 
to infringe by the same person . . . is to sue the man who caused the 
infringement, rather than the multitude.”245  In considering Commil, 
however, the Supreme Court downplayed the role of Section 271(b).  Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia opined, respectively, that “once you have 
a few successful suits against users rather than inducers, both . . . will get 
the message” and that Section 271(b) is a “supplemental cause of action.”246  
This oversimplification fails to recognize that actions of induced 
infringement should target “the brains of the enterprise” rather than 
“innocent end user[s].”247  A significant amount of third-party purchasers 
have no real knowledge of the accused products and thus cannot adequately 
defend their actions.248  Targeting manufacturers, however, resolves issues 
of infringement in one comprehensive trial.249 
This efficient remedy becomes obscured, however, when 
manufacturers can claim a good faith belief in invalidity as a defense to the 
intent requirement of induced infringement.  In Global-Tech, the Supreme 
Court set forth a dual standard of knowledge in which the inducer must 
have knowledge that the patent exists and that the induced acts would cause 
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infringement.250  In factoring a good faith belief in invalidity into its intent 
analysis, the Federal Circuit in Commil devised a conflicting holding that 
would prove onerous for patentees.  The Federal Circuit held that such a 
defense would negate the requisite intent for induced infringement but 
would not preclude a finding of induced infringement.251 
Following the lower court’s decision, several courts attempted to apply 
what seemed like an absolute bar to liability.  For example, in Halo 
Electronics Inc. v. Pulse Electronics Inc.,252 the district court stated that a 
good faith belief in invalidity does not preclude a finding of induced 
infringement.253  Nevertheless, the court ultimately deemed proper jury 
instructions that clearly stated that the defendant could not be liable for 
inducement if he believed the patents were invalid.254  Halo indicates that 
the Federal Circuit in Commil effectively created a loophole from the 
Global-Tech knowledge requirement that eliminates culpability of an 
infringer. 
In light of this ambiguity, patent holders faced with this defense would 
have difficulty proving that a defendant’s alleged good faith belief was not 
truly genuine.  Much like in Halo, accused inducers would argue to the jury 
that even if a patent is valid, a belief in invalidity prevents liability.  Despite 
parallel litigations and ex parte reexaminations by the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) confirming a patent’s validity, 
defendants maintain an opportunity to avoid punishment.  Moreover, 
already crippled by “a slew of defenses including non-infringement, 
multiple grounds of invalidity . . . and various equitable defenses,” 
patentees would also confront a defense of a good faith belief of invalidity 
based on opinion from counsel.255  Without insight into a defendant’s 
subjective knowledge, a patent holder can never truly ascertain whether 
such reliance was held in good faith. 
As described supra in Part II.A.2, the intent requirement of induced 
infringement balances “the public’s access to non-infringing uses of 
products against the patent owner’s right to a remedy when the use is 
infringing.”256  By stipulating a two-part standard that requires both 
knowledge of the patent and intent to cause a third party to directly infringe, 
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Section 271(b) provides patent holders protection from induced 
infringement, yet forces them to meet a higher standard of proof to 
demonstrate culpability.  In overruling Henry,257 the Supreme Court limited 
the scope of exclusive rights to the invention and processes described in the 
patent.  This decision enabled the public to use unpatented components or 
engage in the sale of products equally capable of infringing or non-
infringing uses without retribution.258  To effectuate this outcome, the intent 
requirement ensures that patent holders cannot capitalize on mere “misuse” 
of a product.  Instead, patent holders must demonstrate that the 
manufacturer or supplier had actual knowledge of their infringing 
actions.259 
Incorporating a defense of good faith belief in invalidity into induced 
infringement proceedings disrupts this carefully formulated balance in favor 
of potential infringers.  As evidenced by precedent culminating in the 
Global-Tech standard, culpability for induced infringement flows from 
actual knowledge of infringement, not mere misuse.260  A defense of 
subjective belief in invalidity would insulate from liability defendants who 
admit to knowledge of both the patent and infringing behavior.  Under this 
approach, however, defendants with good faith, but mistaken beliefs in 
invalidity, would proceed with otherwise illegal action in the hope that the 
patent is invalid.  Moreover, the new defense “only serve[s] to limit the 
rights of patentees with valid patents and meritorious claims.”261  In 
circumstances where a patent has withstood all challenges of invalidity and 
unenforceability, and a patentee has proved both direct infringement by 
third parties and intentional inducement by a defendant who had knowledge 
of the patent, the defendant can nevertheless escape liability by invoking 
this defense.  This would be nearly impossible to overcome. 
C.  Engaging in a Cross-Application of Protectability Doctrines 
Provides Clarity for Future Intellectual Property Adjudications 
Given the merits of aligning patent law with copyright and trademark 
jurisprudence, the Commil Court could have drawn a correlation between 
the policy rationales set forth under each body of law.  Although the 
Supreme Court incorporated analogies of tortious interference and criminal 
law, they did so “[a]s a final note” and without a nod to patent law’s sisters, 
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copyright and trademark.262  This omission is particularly troublesome in 
light of Global-Tech’s reliance on the Grokster copyright opinion.  Had the 
Commil Court made such connections, the resulting opinion would have 
been bolstered by uniformity and consistency. 
Patent, trademark, and copyright law share common legislative and 
historical origins in the United States.  For instance, patent and copyright 
law appear “hand-in-hand in the Constitution and Congress enacted the first 
patent and copyright acts in 1790.”263  Patent and trademark law similarly 
are both adjudicated by the USPTO and Federal Circuit.264  Given this 
“historic kinship,”265 courts frequently engage in cross-application of 
doctrines within each discipline.  In the 2006 decision eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC.,266 the Supreme Court endorsed this practice by 
“discard[ing] nearly a century of patent precedent [concerning viability of 
presumptive injunctions] in favor of a better standard articulated in 
copyright law.”267 
Continuing the cross-application of intellectual property doctrines will 
ultimately balance the various incentives of right holders and the free 
marketplace.  Past examples of courts applying one doctrine of intellectual 
property to another include cases of contributory infringement,268 misuse,269 
and first sale.270  Given its importance, protectability should similarly “be 
examined in a unified and functional fashion across [the laws], rather than 
as separate regimes.”271  Determining protectability of patents, copyrights, 
and trademarks “is the key to whether particular works can reap the benefits 
of intellectual property protection and, correspondingly, whether the 
availability of protection will encourage the production of such works in the 
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first instance.”272  Therefore, the Commil holding would have benefitted 
from the cross-application of trademark and copyright protectability 
doctrines to patent law. 
In Commil, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to create such a 
unified regime in clarifying the intent requirement and applicable defenses 
for induced infringement.  The Commil Court initiated its analysis with a 
reaffirmation of the intent standard articulated in Global-Tech, a decision 
aided in large part by the previously discussed copyright case Grokster.273  
Settling on a two-part knowledge requirement for copyright infringement, 
Grokster distinguished mere knowledge of infringing potential and ordinary 
acts incident to product distribution from purposeful, culpable conduct.  In 
doing so, the Supreme Court ensured that the inducement rule would do 
“nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation 
having a lawful promise.”274  The Commil Court should have, in addition to 
its structural analysis of the Patent Act, invoked policy rationales to better 
align the purposes of intellectual property law.275 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Commil USA LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court held 
that the requisite intent for induced infringement liability cannot be negated 
by a good faith belief in invalidity.276  At the outset of its opinion, the Court 
purposefully reiterated its prior holding in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. 
SEB S.A.277  Induced patent infringement, the Court emphasized, demands a 
higher mental state in which the defendant knew of the patent, and that the 
induced acts constitute infringement.278  Without proof of this dual 
knowledge, liability cannot attach.279  After this introduction, however, the 
Commil Court strayed from the significance of the intent requirement under 
Section 271(b), choosing instead to expound on the contentious distinction 
between “validity” and “infringement.”280 
The Court could have bolstered its reasoning by reinforcing and 
advancing the policy rationales underlying Section 271(b).  Permitting a 
good faith defense in patent invalidity would disrupt not only the carefully 
formulated marketplace balance of rights but also the cross-application of 
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intellectual property doctrines by courts.  Applying the protectability 
mechanisms of trademark and copyright law to induced patent infringement 
would facilitate a uniform standard of intent that would guide courts in 
future adjudications.281  Given this alternative analysis, the Commil holding 
could have promoted both clarification of the intent requirement and 
increased protectability within the intellectual property market, resulting in 
a decision truly made in good faith.282 
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